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FORFEITURE OF LEGAL FEES: WHO STANDS TO

LOSE?
by
G. Robert Blakey*

Free competition prevails at the bar as well as elsewhere, and
different men command different rates of compensation, and
some of them much in excess of any official salaries. Thus far
the experience of the commonwealth has been that this freedom has not operated to keep citizens from the courts, or to
shut the poor off from justice. - Oliver Wendell Holmes"
In a sense, this panel and the people in this room are among the
most qualified people in the United States to discuss the question
of the forfeiture of legal fees. We have with us today distinguished
academics who have written and studied the issue. We have today
with us able practitioners who have had to live with this issue in
the context of the day to day trial of cases. We are drawn from all
areas of the country. We are certainly not provincial. But we
should be frank. We are also the most disqualified people in the
United States to discuss this issue, and the principle of our disqualification is as old as Dr. Bonham's case:2 no man can be a
judge in his own case.
Let us strip away the rhetoric. Let us not discuss this as a constitutional question under the sixth amendment. Let us not discuss
this as a subtle question of statutory analysis. Let us not discuss
this as the sort of question in which law professors draw nice distinctions between close cases. Let us instead focus on the real issue: How shall legal fees be determined in our society?
*William J. and Dorothy O'Neil Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. These remarks were prepared for a panel discussion at the 1987 Annual Meeting of the Associations
of American Law Schools, held on January 3-6, 1987 in Los Angeles, California. They have
been edited, but do not contain the qualifications or sources that would be appropriate for a
more formal paper. Professor Blakey served as Chief Counsel of the Senate Subcommittee
on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the United States Senate in 1969-1970, when the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970), was processed.
I Hyde v. Moxie Nerve-Food Co., 160 Mass. 559, 36 N.E. 585, 586 (1894).
2 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (K.B. 1610).
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We have three alternatives. Legal fees can be determined by the
free market, and that is, bluntly, by the highest bidder. He who
has the most money can buy the best lawyer. Or legal fees can be
determined by political decision, which means they will be set by
the political determinations that fix the salaries of the various public defenders. And if not by the free market or the public defender
system, then legal fees will be determined by a third system, by
the judiciary on a case by case basis of appointing counsel, or perhaps by some review process of the free market. The question is
whether legal fees shall be set by the judiciary on a Criminal Justice Act (CJA) fee schedule, or case by case on some broader basis.'
Let us make explicit what few of us are saying: If fees are to be
set by the judiciary under CJA under a complex case analysis or
otherwise, those fees will probably be smaller. The average partner
at a major law firm, age 50, makes about $165,000 per year. That
means fifty percent of partners make more than that, and fifty percent make less. But the average federal judge makes just about
half of that. So when it comes time for a judge to set those fees,
even in complex litigation, he or she will be setting them, case by
case, not in comparison with partner's salaries, but in comparison
with a judge's salary. Compared to the free market, that will be a
very different fee schedule.
Let us be upfront, too, about the kinds of cases we are discussing. We are not talking about the majority of cases that come up in
the federal or state courts. The vast majority of criminal defendants are poor and are already being handled under CJA or some
comparable system of public defenders. We are not talking about
white collar offenders, tax evaders, or antitrust violators. Those offenders will typically have sources of funds that arguably are not
tainted. They can pay and will pay the free market price.
What we are talking about is the professional offender. We are
not talking about the bank robber, because no one in this room will
argue that a lawyer ought to take his or her fees out of the proceeds of a bank robbery.4 We are not talking about the professional
I See generally 18 U.S.C.

§ 3006A (d)(1982, Supp. II 1984 & Supp. III 1985).
See, e.g., Bennett v. State, 211 So. 2d 520 (Miss. 1968) (lawyer convicted of receipt of
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scam artist, because I do not think anybody in this room will argue
that a lawyer ought to take his or her fees out of the fruits of a
fraud. That is, as against an identifiable victim of a bank robbery
or of a land fraud scam, the conflict between the lawyer and the
victim is going to be won by the victim.
Who are we talking about? Pimps, gamblers, and, let us be
blunt, principally drug dealers. So the issue, rephrased, becomes,
how shall legal fees be set in drug cases?
Now let us turn to the background.
In 1970, Congress drafted two statutes that created these issues.
One of them is the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations
(RICO) statute; 5 the other is the Continuing Criminal Enterprise
(CCE) statute.' They are two halves of the same idea. They were
both drafted at the same time and by the same principal Senators,
members of Congress, and staff. It wasn't clear to those of us involved in drafting them which statute, if either, would become law.
It is possible to say that the CCE statute is a RICO drug statute. It
is also possible to say that RICO is CCE for everybody else. The
statutes are parallel in their language, in their philosophy, and in
their impact.
What is, or what was, their philosophy? Well, the old law, the
law of the nineteenth century, was the law of common law felonies
murder, rape, and robbery. Essentially, it focused on a single
incident, involving a single perpetrator and a single victim. We
prosecuted such offenders one by one and, typically, tried to lock
them up for some period of imprisonment.
In 1970 Congress decided that that kind of crime and that kind
of a criminal justice system was inadequate to deal with modern
forms of organizational crime. I did not say "organized crime," in
the sense of the Mafia. I said organizational crime - that is, orgastolen property from client and disbarred), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 320 (1969); Errico v.
County of Westchester, 39 Misc. 2d 1090, 242 N.Y.S.2d 524 (1963) (attorney not entitled to
take fee from stolen property).
18 U.S.C., §§ 1961-68 (1982, Supp. II 1984 & Supp. III 1985).
6 21 U.S.C. §§848, 853 (1982, Supp. II 1984 & Supp. III 1985); 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 1956(c)(7)(C)(West Supp. 1987).
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nizations engaging in crime as perpetrators, as victims, or as instruments of the activity, whether they commit white collar crime,
fraud, or organized crime involving drugs. The nineteenth century
criminal justice system simply did not adequately respond to such
modern organizational crime. Consequently, any new law had to do
at least three things.
First, it had to focus not simply on individuals, but also on organizations. Second, it had to authorize or make possible more extended terms of imprisonment. The old philosophy of rehabilitation or of deterence simply was not adequate to deal with
organizational crime. Therefore, any new law had to adopt some
system of incapacitation.
Finally, it was not enough to send the leader to jail, because he
or she could be replaced. The law had to strike at the heart of the
motivation of the offender and the crime itself. It had to strike at
property. It was not enough to take away criminals' liberty. To
make any impact on this kind of crime, the law had to deprive the
organization of one source of its power - money. I am talking
about taking, not only liberty, but also property.
I am not a Marxist.' I do not usually make a wholly economic
analysis of the law. But the judgment was made in 1970 that these
kinds of crimes were not principally motivated by poverty, by passion, by mental disease, or by discrimination, but by desire for
money or profit; they were, in some sense, the product of rational
calculation. They fit Bentham's model.' Any crime model that simply made an effort to deal with them in the old way, depriving
them only of liberty, but not of power and profit as well, simply
would be ineffective.
Dealing with liberty, power, and profit is exactly what RICO and
CCE do. Both focus on enterprises - groups of people engaging
not in single offenses, but in patterns or series of offenses. Given
those two elements, "patterns" and "enterprises," RICO and CCE
adopt a philosophy of long term imprisonment and stiff economic
sanction (the seizure of the assets gained from or used in the
See Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, 2 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFF. 217 (1973).
J. BENTHAM, WORKS 396, 402 (J. Bowring ed. 1843).
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course of the offence).
Now, let us discuss candidly why those kinds of organizations
exist in our society. They service a demand. There is a demand in
our society for illicit sex, if any sex is illicit anymore. There is a
demand in our society for illicit chance. There is a demand in our
society for drugs. We call them recreational drugs and are basically
schizophrenic about them. On the one hand, we use them. On the
other hand, we know that we should not. Drug laws reflect that
schizophrenia. Look at the drug traffic, and ask yourself why people sell drugs. People are in it to make money. The threat, then, of
RICO and CCE is long term imprisonment and the seizure of
assets.
Just as these criminal organizations service a demand, they also
create a demand in our society. These organizations need services;
they need bankers to launder their money, real estate brokers to
invest in physical assets, and stock brokers to invest in intangible
assets.
And they need lawyers to keep the law off their backs. They
need house counsel to make possible their day-to-day operations;
they need corrupt lawyers to make possible their operations. I am
not suggesting that all bankers, stock brokers, real estate agents, or
lawyers that deal with such organizations are corrupt, but I am
telling you that some are.9 And any assumption that they are not,
that all of the lawyers involved with these organizations are in
some sense just nineteenth century single practitioners, handling
their cases one by one, is bizarre. It is not part of the real world.
In order to authorize the seizure of assets associated with illegal
enterprises that engage in servicing various illicit demands of our
society, questions of a legal nature must be answered. They are:
How will we go about doing it?; Shall we take essentially a criminal
tack? Shall we take essentially a civil tack? There are, fortunately,
due process limitations in our Constitution on how we go about
seizing other people's property. There are also serious questions
See Staff Reporter on Mob Lawyers: President's Commission on Organized Crime,
37 CaM. L. RPTR. 201820 (1985) (renegade attorneys who work for the "mob" constitute
significant threat to the integrity of the bar disproportionate to their numbers).
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about when we should seize the property. What do we do about
that period of time between the day the process begins and the day
the process ends? We are, presumably, attempting to seize assets
from bad people. I am not talking about the presumption of innocence appropriate to trial, but the real world perspective of law
enforcement: We do not bring cases against people who are in fact
innocent. We do bring cases against people who are presumed to
be innocent. But the government has every reason to believe that
in fact they are guilty. Since eighty-five to ninety percent of the
people plead guilty, the government is correct eighty-five to ninety
percent of the time. My point is that most people in the system
are, in fact, guilty. And if we wait until the conclusion of the litigation, will there be any assets there to seize?
What we have to do, on the criminal side, is precisely what we
do on the civil side. There is a whole set of civil law remedies attachment, equitable attachment, freeze orders, injunctions with which we have extensive experience. In 1970, a decision was
made to adapt or adopt those processes for the seizure of property
to the criminal process in the same way we have always used them
to seize live bodies. We begin a criminal case by seizing a defendant, and then bailing him. Why? Because if we only tagged him
and expected him to wait until the criminal process was all over, it
is highly likely that he would not be there. Do we honestly believe
that that same defendant will leave his assets around for us to
seize at the end of a trial?
If every defendant were adjudicated guilty, -we would have little
problem. But a serious problem arises in determining what kind of
process - criminal or civil - shall we give to people in the seizure
of assets. How shall we seize assets - at least preliminarily - between the time we begin the investigation and the time we end the
adjudication? 10 That is the issue we face today.
,0 See United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463 (5th Cir. 1986) (since Rule 65 hearing
requirement applicable to CCE, not violation of due process; indictment may not be challenged; grand jury finding not irrebuttable; exception in living expenses and legal fees question of discretion; necessary knowledge of counsel does not defeat right to fees); United
States v. Crozier, 777 F.2d 1376, 1383-84 (9th Cir. 1985) (ex parte TRO under § 853 violated
due process; Rule 65 read into provision; hearing required to restrain property of defendant
and third party); United States v. Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316, 1324-27 (8th Cir. 1985) (ex porte
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The 1970 statutes were drafted based upon several assumptions.
One assumption was that this was to be a new beginning, an effort
to deal with these problems in a new way. The statutes were
drafted like a lot of efforts of that kind: when we began, we
blocked it out in general. We did not come to the problem with a
fully formed or detailed understanding of what the real problem
was, because it was a new problem. This was not codification; it
was innovation.
A few other assumptions were made as well. One was that the
Department of Justice was committed to this kind of program. We
believed that it would be implemented with discretion, but vigorously. Another assumption was that the federal judiciary would accept the legislation with sympathy and implement it with care and
discretion. A further assumption was that the practicing bar - on
the criminal and civil side of RICO - would come to it with a
certain amount of intelligence and sympathy for the problem. To
assure that the law was nudged in the right direction, RICO was
not only broadly written, but also was denominated a remedial, not
a criminal, statute. Its liberal interpretation was also enjoined.1 1
It turns out that in practice, all of those assumptions were
wrong. The Department of Justice ignored RICO for the better
part of a decade. It has only recently become the tool it was
designed to be, as, for example, in the Mafia prosecutions. Everybody knows in New York that the heads of the five families just
went down. What many of you do not know is that nine of the
eleven defendants in the original indictment were personally
TRO under § 848(d) violated due process; Rule 65 read into provision; must find irreparable
injury; solvent defendant may not be denied choice of counsel, citing United States v. Ray,
731 F.2d 1361, 1365 (9th Cir. 1984)). But see Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 122-25 n.27
(1975) ("[tlhe relatively simple civil procedures . . . are inapposite and irrelevant in the
wholly different context of the criminal justice system"); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht
Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 676-80 (1974) (Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 93-94 n.30 (1972)
inapplicable to forfeitures). See also Pierce v. United States, 255 U.S. 398, 401-02 (1921)
(Brandeis, J.) ("The corporation cannot disable itself from responding [to a prospective
fine] by distributing its property among its stockholders and leaving remediless those having
valid claims."); An Act against Fraudulent Deeds, alienations, etc., 1570, 13 Eliz., ch. 5
(fraudulent conveyances avoidable).
"I 84 Stat. 947 (1970).
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named in the 1969 Senate committee report on RICO.12 The Department of Justice did not get around to using RICO against the
named targets for fifteen years. The statute simply has not received an imaginative or a vigorous implementation by the Department of Justice.
Let me confess, with candor, that these assumptions were naive.
It turns out that Department of Justice lawyers, like all of us, tend
to do today what was left unfinished yesterday. New ideas and approaches coming from the outside are seldom well received. It has
taken the Justice Department lawyers a great deal of time to study
RICO and understand it. The thing to say in their behalf is that
now they do understand it, and they are using it creatively.
In drafting RICO and CCE, we also assumed that if we blocked
out the general direction in which these procedural provisions
should move, the judiciary would work it out. For example, we did
not put on the face of the statute a provision dealing with notice in
the indictment for interests to be forfeited, or for special verdicts,
which obviously are necessary. We assumed that that should be
done by rulemaking process. Indeed, after the statute was passed,
Senator McClellan asked the staff to talk to the Rule Committee
about adding provisions of that sort to the federal rules. We assumed, in short, that the language in the statute that dealt with
these things generally would be implemented with sympathy by
the judiciary. We were wrong. The federal judiciary came to the
statutes as a country parson reading the first chapter of Genesis-with a dry and hostile literalism.1 3
Understand what has happened since. Congress supports the approach established in RICO and CCE, which have endured over
the better part of almost twenty years. Senator McClellan is dead
12See TIME, Dec. 1, 1986, at 32 (conviction of eight men in Commission prosecution,
among whom were the leaders of three of New York City five crime families); compare S.
REP. No. 617, 91st Cong. 1st Sess. 36-43 (1969) (five of nine individuals indicted in 1985
identified) with N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1985, at 1, col. 2 (nine mob leaders indicted, four of
whom on Commission and heading New York City crime families).
,3 See, e.g., United States v. Marubeni America Corp., 611 F.2d 763, 765-70 (9th Cir.
1980) (§ 1963(a)(1) forfeiture limited to interest in an enterprise); United States v. McManigal, 708 F.2d 276, 283-87 (7th Cir). (same holding), vacated, 464 U.S. 979, aff'd as modified,
723 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1983).
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now, God rest his soul. If he alone had supported these statutes,
they would long since have been buried with him. However, he has
been succeeded in this area by no less than Senator Ted Kennedy.
And if you want to look for somebody who is an opposite of John
McClellan, an old Southern conservative, look at Ted Kennedy, a
young Northern liberal.
Thus, the recognition of the need to do something about modern
14
kinds of organized crime and drug traffic led to the 1984 Act,
which said that half of what the federal judiciary had done in interpreting RICO and CCE was wrong. It overruled several opinions. 5 It made what began like a constitution, in its generality,
look like a provision of the federal revenue code, detailing what
property could be seized, and how it could be seized, and what process was due.
In passing the 1984 Act, Congress committed itself to making
RICO and CCE work, if necessary, over the objections of the federal judiciary, over the objections of the practicing bar and of criminal defense lawyers. The thrust in our society is to do something
about these problems, but not to do it mindlessly. Our society
wants to find out what will, as a practical matter, be effective
against organizational crime, consistent with our history and tradition. Make no mistake about it.
This brings me back to where I began. I do not believe that the
forfeiture of legal fees has a lot to do with the sixth amendment.
Nothing in the text of the sixth amendment directly addresses
whether lawyers' fees should be set by the free market, by judges,
or by salaries. Nor is there any material on fee forfeiture in the
history of the constitutional convention or the arguments and debates about the ratification of the sixth amendment. I am not
presenting an Ed Meece original intent analysis. But as a matter of
,4 Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 301, 98 Stat. 1837, 2040
(1984). See generally Reed, Criminal Forfeiture Under the Comprehensive ForfeitureAct
of 1984: Raising the Stakes, 22 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 747 (1984).
,5 See cases cited supra note 13. See also United States v. McManigal, 708 F.2d 276,
287-90 (no relation back except sham); cf. United States v. Veon, 549 F. Supp. 274, 280 n.13
(E.D. Cal. 1982) (lis pendens notice struck under CCE since no interest in property until
judgment), reversed without op., 720 F.2d 685 (9th Cir. 1983).
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original intent, fee forfeiture is not mentioned.
Similarly, any one of you could, of course, draft an argument
that this either is or is not a sixth amendment question. Anyone
here who believes that the general language of the amendment
could not be so construed is not familiar with legal realism. I am
saying, however, that this is not the kind of constitutional question
that original intent or anything in current jurisprudence can resolve. It is not a statutory analysis question, either. As the discussion above shows, we cannot settle this by interpreting the statute
itself. The real issue before us is not what the Constitution or the
statute says, but what we as a community can do to resolve the
problem.
I suggest to you that this is a question of identifying the interests involved and balancing them. We have polar positions. One
position says that this ought to be solely a free market question to
be resolved by the lawyer and the client. If the client has illicit
assets, he or she should be able to pay them to a lawyer, rather
than forfeit them to the government. As a private defense attorney, that is the view that I would like to see prevail. The largest
single fee I ever earned was in a drug case. I would hate to think
that I would have to sell my time at what it is truly worth, rather
than what I can command when working on RICO and CCE cases.
But should my personal view be adopted by society?
The position on the other side is that there will be no private
defense bar in these cases; they will be all handled by CJA appointments or by public defenders. I find that equally
unacceptable.
So the question remains: how can we work this out so that our
society can realize, and actualize, what we need and what we want?
I will leave its resolution to my compatriots.16
16Compare United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463 (5th Cir. 1986)(necessary knowledge
acquired by defense counsel not disqualifying as BFP) with United States v. Harvey, 814
F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987)(RICO and CCE apply to forfeit legal fees, but are unconstitutional
as applied). See also United States v. Raimondo, 721 F.2d 476, 478 (4th Cir. 1983)(per
curiam) (CCE before 1984 amendment applicable to legal fee); United States v. Long, 654
F.2d 911, 917 (3d Cir. 1981) (same holding); Payden v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 839, 849
n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (RICO and CCE after 1984 amendment applicable to legal fee; Rogers
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rejected), rev'd on other grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Rogers, 602 F.
Supp. 1332, 1343-345, 1348 (D. Colo. 1985) (unconstitutional as applied to "legitimate transfer for value" of legal fee (except sham); motion granted to exclude; lenity applied; requires
more than indictment for permanent restraining order (rule 65)); United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 196-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (unconstitutional as applied to legal fees).
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